# 网络钓鱼与欺诈

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Recently, I've seen several cases of private key leaks leading to asset theft, and I truly feel for the victims. From fake trading bots hiding malicious code, to the Milk Sad incident spanning over 5 years, and to friends recently losing large sums due to phishing attacks—these all tell us the same harsh truth: in the Web3 world, private key security is the lifeline.
Honestly, I was a bit shocked when I read about Wang Chun's experience. A seasoned industry veteran transferred 500 BTC to test whether his private key was compromised, only to have hackers take away 490 BTC—this is not

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Seeing this 50 million USDT phishing case, my mind immediately flashed back to the various scams I've seen over the past decade. Early exchange hacks in 2014, ICO scams in 2017, Yield farming flash loan attacks in 2020... Each cycle brings new tricks, but fundamentally they all exploit human negligence.
The reason why "address poisoning" this time succeeded precisely exposes the industry's most fatal weakness—the contradiction between convenience and security. The ellipsis truncating the address (0xbaf4...B6495F8b) looks friendly, reducing cognitive load, but it is this "friendliness

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Damn, 50 million USDT just disappeared like that? 🤯 Address poisoning is a brilliant move; phishing guys first transfer 0.005 USDT to test the waters, and once the whale copy-pastes, it's gg—sending 16,624 ETH directly to someone.
The most outrageous part is that they still need to wash the funds through Tornado, and this process is really complete. The Ethereum Foundation only recently stopped truncating addresses with ellipses, which feels a bit late, but better late than never. Displaying addresses like 0xbaf4b1aF...B6495F8b5 is definitely a trap—you can't see clearly if the full

The phishing case involving 50 million USDT #网络钓鱼与欺诈 is worth an in-depth analysis. The victim's response strategy is quite clear: first, monitor the entire chain to lock down the attacker; then, offer an exit route through a 48-hour white-hat bounty plan; finally, escalate legally with threats. This logical chain is quite standard in on-chain game theory.
But the more noteworthy detail lies in the attack method—the phishing addresses generated with the first and last three digits identical. This indicates that the victim did not perform a complete address verification during copy-paste. The

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 I just saw an inexplicable 0.005 USDT transfer into my wallet a moment ago, and I almost freaked out😱. Later, I realized this was a "address poisoning" attack! Phishers can actually forge addresses with the same start and end, tricking people into making mistakes during copy-paste. The case where 50 million USDT was stolen is truly shocking.
The scariest part is that the victim simply copied a similar-looking address from recent transaction records, and all the funds were gone. Now I understand why everyone keeps emphasizing "never omit parts of the address"—ellipsis really is a hid

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Recently, I came across several real scam cases and thought it would be good to discuss them with everyone. In the Zhejiang case involving 3 million virtual coins, the scammers' tactics are actually quite similar: first, they attract investments through fake platforms, then they intervene in the "acceptance" stage by claiming "large amounts require offline transactions," and finally, the accounts are completely unable to withdraw funds. What's even worse is that they also teach victims how to talk to the police in advance.
Another case involves Coinbase, where a 23-year-old guy disgu

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Seeing Wang Chun's comment, I froze entirely. Verifying whether 500 BTC private keys have been leaked, hackers then transferred away 490 BTC—this isn't a joke; it's a real on-chain tragedy.
The scariest part isn't the loss itself, but the fact that your private key security defenses are collapsing in ways you can't imagine. From hidden backdoors in Polymarket's copycat bot GitHub repository, to the $3.7 billion weak random number vulnerability in the Lubian mining pool in 2020, to a series of failures in Trust Wallet and Libbitcoin—these all tell us the same truth: your money isn't b

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Recently saw Wang Chun's comment, couldn't help but laugh and feel a bit upset. Verifying a private key with 500 BTC, and the hacker still "considerately" left 10 — behind this almost joke-like experience is the ongoing neglect of security across the entire ecosystem.
Thinking of the malicious code incident with Polymarket copy trading bots, I suddenly realize a harsh reality: risks never come only from technical vulnerabilities; more often, they stem from the temptation of "convenience." Those malicious packages hidden on GitHub may seem like developer issues on the surface, but fun

#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Seeing the 50 million USDT phishing case, I am reminded of the many similar stories I have encountered over the years. Victims are often intelligent people who slip up over a seemingly minor detail—the truncated address.
The essence of this incident is actually quite heartbreaking: we are accustomed to convenience, but in that convenience, hidden dangers are lurking. When copying and pasting, seeing "0xbaf4...B649" seems fine, but unaware that scammers have carefully generated deceptive addresses with matching start and end characters. The risk is hidden in our visual blind spots.
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