The 2026 Hong Kong listing wave, the true choice of capital that passes the Turing test

By the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, Chinese semiconductor and AI companies are intensively pushing for listings in Hong Kong. This phenomenon is not merely a market boom. Rather, it can be seen as a Turing test where each company reveals its survival strategy through its capital structure and investor list. The question of who has invested and what capital has entered serves as a true test of these companies’ intentions and survival paths.

The Turing Test for Removing Americanization: Why Hong Kong Has Become the Only Choice

In the past, Hong Kong served as a stepping stone for Chinese capital to go international. However, as the US-China tech war deepened, the situation changed rapidly. Due to US technology regulations and sanctions, Chinese semiconductor and AI companies have been shut out of US listings. At the same time, they still desperately need international pricing and external liquidity.

In this dilemma, Hong Kong has transformed from a simple financial hub into a strategic buffer zone. First, by listing within China’s legal framework, they can minimize data and regulatory risks. Second, they still have access to international capital, especially from Middle Eastern sovereign funds and long-term Southeast Asian capital. Third, reforms like the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s 18C have made it possible for even unprofitable strategic companies to list.

The influx of China’s hard-tech companies into Hong Kong is a race to secure capital before harsher sanctions arrive. This is not market opportunity but an inevitable necessity for survival.

Reorganization of Investor Lists: A Major Shift from Dollar Capital to Middle Eastern Funds

The core of this wave of Hong Kong listings is the rapid change in investor composition. In the past, US dollar funds were the main source of capital for Chinese tech firms. But as geopolitical tensions escalate, this pattern is being completely overturned.

Long-term dollar capital is systematically retreating. Instead, Middle Eastern sovereign funds such as ADIA, Eastspring, and Goei Asset, along with Asia-Pacific hedge funds, have emerged as major liquidity providers. They serve as anchors for international pricing and are creating new valuation standards.

At the same time, the influence of renminbi (RMB) capital has surged. Large corporations and state-owned capital at the regional government level are entering as strategic investors, aiming not just for financial returns but for acquiring computing power, talent, and ecosystem resources. This shift in investor composition itself is a Turing test revealing how concretely Chinese companies are executing their survival strategies.

Four Survival Models and the Restructuring of Capital Structures

Looking at the investor lists of the four leading Hong Kong-listed companies in 2026—MiniMax, Zhibiao, Bilan, and Joye—clearly illustrates how multi-layered China’s hard-tech capital strategies are.

All these companies show four common changes: first, a shift from dollar-centric to diversified sources of capital; second, a replacement of external liquidity providers with Middle Eastern and Asia-Pacific funds; third, a shift toward internalized supply chains through equity structures; and fourth, redefining state-owned capital from mere investors to strategic partners.

MiniMax: From Dollar Trust to Supply Chain Alliances

MiniMax’s capital evolution can be divided into three stages.

In the initial phase, dollar VC firms like Gaoling Capital, IDG, Sequoia China, and Gobi Partners dominated. Their role was to frame technological bets as future possibilities, focusing on trust expansion rather than short-term profits.

In the next phase, large platform companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Meihau, and Xiaomi entered. This was not just investment but supply chain integration. Major firms provide scenes, liquidity, and computing power, while MiniMax offers stock and ecosystem access. Their customer bases and distribution channels are recorded within the equity structure.

In the final stage, investors like ADIA, Mirae Asset, Hanwha Investment, and Goei Asset joined. They serve to replace external dollar liquidity. Middle Eastern sovereign funds guarantee external capital inflows, Asia-Pacific hedge funds set valuation benchmarks, and RMB capital ensures structural stability. This signals the creation of a new valuation system beyond simple IPO pricing.

Zhibiao AI: From Academic Credit to National Asset

Zhibiao’s capital history differs from typical startups; it is closer to a national-level trajectory.

Academic credibility comes first. Originating from knowledge engineering labs at Tsinghua University’s Computer Science Department, accumulated technology attracted initial capital. Early investors like Mingjing Venture Capital, Junlian Capital, Zhongguo Chuangsheng bet on China’s need for large-scale language models, not immediate profits but strategic necessity.

Subsequently, competing large firms such as Alibaba, Tencent, Meituan, and Xiaomi appeared as shareholders. This may seem contradictory but actually reflects collective anxiety. They don’t need to monopolize but are wary of others doing so. Zhibiao’s ‘neutrality’ has become a rare asset.

The turning point was when regional government capital became a major liquidity provider. Funds like Beijing’s AI Industry Investment Fund, Shanghai Pudong Venture Capital, and Hangzhou’s Employment Investment Group entered. After the decline of active dollar capital, these local state-owned funds took the lead, aiming to expand computing centers, talent pools, and upstream-downstream ecosystems.

The final step is Hong Kong listing, with global funds like Goei Asset, Zhongjin, Taikang Life, and Prosperity7 Ventures joining. This signifies Zhibiao’s evolution from “academic credit-based” to a “national strategic asset.” The entire process is a Turing test: who invested, at what stage they entered, revealing the company’s true status and role.

Bilan Technology: Entry of Domestic Capital Post Sanctions

Bilan’s capital structure reads like a textbook of wartime capital raising.

Initially, Mingjing Venture Capital, IDG, and Gaoling Capital provided speed and momentum. Their role was to transform technological bets into recognized unicorn stories.

However, after Bilan was listed on the US trade blacklist, a shift occurred. The boundaries of dollar capital contracted, and supply chain risks surged. Domestic firms and government funds such as Shanghai Guosheng, Guangzhou Industrial Investment, Gri Jin Investment, and Hengqin Jin Investment entered en masse. They brought policy support and patient capital, continuing heavy investments in distribution and R&D.

The appearance of channel-type large corporations (such as Xinshu Digital, Zhengda Group) among IPO foundational investors is particularly significant. It’s a direct signal: to record customer acquisition within the capital structure. Stocks transform into defense contracts, and downstream markets are locked into the capital structure. The domestic GPU supply chain is shifting from hardware to stock ownership.

Joye: From Globalization to a Generation of National Assets

Among the four companies, Joye’s history is closest to a condensed version of a 20-year capital saga.

2005–2012 was the golden age of globalization. Starting from Tsinghua alumni networks’ angel capital, funds flowed into Silicon Valley VCs (Walden International, IPV Capital). Dollar funds provided operational support, growth rhythm, and trust in international supply chains. This was the standard growth path during a period when US-China relations were not confrontational.

Since 2016, Joye began returning to mainland China. Before IPO, it introduced a large amount of RMB funds and industrial capital. Funds like Wuweifeng Capital and Zhongxin Jiyuan, along with industrial investors, led the A-share listing.

By 2026, a dual structure of A-share and H-share (Hong Kong) listings is complete. Domestic insurers like Huasha, China Life, and Ping An Pension, along with global sovereign funds such as GIC, have entered. This marks Joye’s full transition from a “product of globalization” to a “national strategic asset.”

Hong Kong IPOs Are Not Just Market Signals but a Geopolitical Turing Test

The message is clear. The US-China tech war will not ease but institutionalize. Chinese tech companies no longer expect global consensus.

Instead, they are adopting new strategies: mobilizing investable capital to rebuild valuation systems. As dollar capital withdraws, Middle Eastern sovereign funds and Asia-Pacific hedge funds fill the gap. Supply chains internalize into equity structures, and large firms and state-owned capital lock upstream and downstream through capital. State-owned capital no longer acts merely as investors but enters as a form of attractor capital, exchanging headquarters, computing power, talent, and ecosystems.

Investor lists are not just names; they are real-time prices of geopolitical risks and a Turing test to determine which capital camp each company belongs to and who will sustain it.

Passing this Turing test is the true meaning of Hong Kong’s 2026 listing. It’s not about market optimism but a survival struggle to find the capital that will support oneself before the wind shifts. There is no place to retreat.