Last night, I went back to look at a voting proposal from a certain DAO. On the surface, it reads very righteous: optimize incentives, improve efficiency... but if you carefully go through the attachments and parameters, it basically boils down to, “whoever can get more voting power, whoever can more steadily keep receiving incentives.” To put it bluntly, once the rules are changed, the power structure shifts along with it. You think you’re voting on a proposal, but in reality you’re voting on how to divide the cake.

Recently, the funding rate has become extremely high/abnormal again, and in the group chat people are arguing about whether to reverse it or keep squeezing the bubble. I’m actually more concerned about these governance proposals: when the market goes crazy, everyone gets too lazy to read the text, and that’s when it’s most convenient to slip in a little hook like “rewarding active voters/agents.” I used to be impulsive and click agree without thinking, but later I developed a habit: before each vote, I write down a line—who ends up getting the most out of this proposal, and whether I’m being led around by incentives. Long-term, it’s not about talent; it’s about this kind of slightly annoying habit that keeps your hands in check.