Annual consecutive losses: How do the "third-generation successors" Lu, Xu, and Yang reshape JunDa Shares' "self-sustaining" ability?

On the evening of March 30, 2026, Hainan Junda New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Junda Co., Ltd.”, 002865.SZ) released its 2025 annual report.

The report shows that the company achieved operating revenue of 7.63B yuan in 2025, a year-on-year decrease of 23.36%; net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company was -1.42B yuan, with losses expanding by 139.51% compared to the previous year. This is the second consecutive year the company has fallen into a loss since its full transition to photovoltaic cell business in 2022, with the loss margin sharply deepening.

This report clearly reflects the true situation of this photovoltaic enterprise once praised as a “model of cross-sector transformation” under the industry downturn.

From automotive interior and exterior parts to photovoltaic cells, Junda Co., Ltd. once wrote a capital myth of nearly tenfold market value increase. However, as industry cycles shift and combined with multiple challenges in strategy and governance, the once “top student” is now facing severe tests.

1. Performance decline and financial difficulties: survival challenges under industry cycles

Junda Co., Ltd.'s performance in 2025 can be described as a “cliff-like decline.” The comprehensive deterioration of key financial data reveals the enormous pressure the company has endured during the deep industry adjustment period.

In 2025, the company’s operating revenue was 7.63B yuan, down 23.36% from 9.95B yuan in 2024, and more than 11 billion yuan below the peak of 18.66B yuan in 2023.

More severely, in 2025, Junda Co., Ltd.'s overall gross profit margin was -1.33%, with the gross margin of its core product, photovoltaic cells, turning negative for the first time, dropping to -1.65%, a decrease of 2.13 percentage points year-on-year. This indicates that the sales price of the company’s battery products can no longer cover production costs, falling into a “selling at a loss” situation. Quarterly, losses showed an expanding trend, especially in the fourth quarter, with a single-quarter loss of 999 million yuan, nearly accounting for most of the year’s total loss.

Meanwhile, the company’s losses have worsened, and cash flow has deteriorated. In 2025, net profit attributable to shareholders was a loss of 1.42B yuan, with net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses even deeper, reaching -1.64B yuan. Cash flow from operating activities shifted from a net inflow of 654 million yuan in 2024 to a net outflow of 486 million yuan, a sharp decline of 174.23% year-on-year. This change indicates that the company not only faces accounting losses but also has serious problems with its core business “self-sustaining” ability.

Large-scale asset impairment provisions are one of the direct reasons for the expanded losses. In 2025, the company made asset impairment provisions totaling 437 million yuan, including 266 million yuan for fixed assets, 119 million yuan for inventories, and 53 million yuan for goodwill. This reflects that, against the background of rapid technological iteration and continuous decline in product prices in the photovoltaic industry, some outdated or inefficient production lines and inventories face value shrinkage pressure. Over the past three years, accumulated impairment provisions have reached 1.65B yuan, continuously eroding the company’s profits.

As of the end of 2025, the company’s asset-liability ratio was as high as 77.69%, further rising from the previous year. Short-term loans totaled 1.06B yuan, and non-current liabilities due within one year reached 2.15B yuan, totaling 3.21B yuan. Meanwhile, among the 4.41B yuan in cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period, 1.46B yuan was restricted funds, limiting actual available funds. High financial expenses (interest expense of 273 million yuan) further increased profit pressure.

In addition, the company’s actual guarantee balance reached 5.17B yuan, accounting for 141.31% of the net assets attributable to the parent company. Among them, guarantees provided for guaranteed objects with asset-liability ratios over 70% amounted to 4.53B yuan, posing potential repayment risks.

The high debt ratio and large external guarantees are like the “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the company. If cash flow further deteriorates or the guaranteed parties encounter risks, it could trigger a serious financial crisis.

On the other hand, the company’s R&D investment in 2025 decreased by 44.35% year-on-year. The number of R&D personnel dropped sharply from 1,348 in 2023 to 324 at the end of 2025. In the rapidly evolving photovoltaic industry, reduced R&D investment may weaken its long-term competitiveness.

2. From gambling on photovoltaics to concept hype: “Space Photovoltaic” concept surges 200%

Junda Co., Ltd.'s development history is a microcosm of transformation from traditional manufacturing to new energy sectors, struggling to survive amid industry cycles.

The company’s predecessor mainly engaged in automotive plastic interior and exterior parts and was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2017. Amid sluggish growth in traditional business and declining net profits year after year, Lu Xiaohong, who took over as chairman in 2019, led the shift into the photovoltaic industry. In 2021, the company acquired a 51% stake in photovoltaic cell company Jietai Technology for 1.43B yuan, officially entering the photovoltaic track; in 2022, it further acquired the remaining 49% stake for 1.52B yuan, achieving full control, and completely divested its original automotive parts business.

This “big eat” acquisition, supported by the high prosperity of the photovoltaic industry at the time, achieved great success. In 2022 and 2023, the company’s net profits reached 716 million yuan and 816 million yuan respectively, and its stock price once surged over 20 times from the 2021 lows, with a market value exceeding 40 billion yuan, becoming a star case of cross-sector transformation.

However, subsequently, with industry overcapacity and restructuring, the photovoltaic industry entered a “winter” period. Facing fierce “internal competition” in the domestic photovoltaic sector, Junda shifted its strategic focus to overseas markets. In 2025, overseas sales revenue reached 3.86B yuan, a significant increase of 62.83% year-on-year, accounting for 50.66% of total revenue, up from 23.85% in 2024.

To support overseas capacity building and global expansion, the company successfully listed on the Hong Kong Main Board in May 2025, becoming the first photovoltaic company to be listed on both the A-share and H-share markets, raising about HKD 1.29 billion. However, the Hong Kong stock listing did not reverse the performance decline; the stock price faced a de-listing risk shortly after listing. This financing was mainly viewed as a move to ease liquidity pressure amid continued losses.

In the context of ongoing losses in core business, the company launched a new story of “Space Photovoltaic” at the end of 2025 to early 2026. It announced a 30 million yuan investment to acquire a stake in Shanghai Xingyi Core Energy Technology Co., Ltd., aiming to develop photovoltaic applications for low-earth orbit satellites and space computing power industries. Although the company explicitly stated that the related technology was still in R&D and the business model uncertain, this concept sparked frenzy in the capital market, with the stock price soaring over 200% in two months.

Interestingly, after the stock price surged due to concept speculation, the company’s controlling shareholder, Hainan Jindi Technology Investment Co., Ltd. (controlled by the Yang family), announced a plan in January 2026 to reduce holdings of no more than 3% of the company’s total share capital. Based on the current stock price, the maximum cash-out could reach about 780 million yuan. This “precise” timing of the reduction raised market doubts about whether the actual controller was cashing out at a high point through concept hype.

3. Under family control: challenges faced by three generations of successors

Junda Co., Ltd. is a typical family-controlled enterprise. The actual controlling persons are Yang Renyuan, Lu Xiaohong, and eight other Yang family members, holding 15.90% of the company through Hainan Jindi Technology Investment Co., Ltd., with Lu Xiaohong directly holding 1.81%.

In August 2025, the company completed a board reshuffle, with Yang Renyuan’s grandson and Lu Xiaohong’s son, Lu Xuyang, taking over as chairman, marking the completion of a three-generation leadership transfer within the Yang family. In the new board, Yang family members still occupy several key positions, showing a highly concentrated family control pattern.

In recent years, management changes have been frequent. In November 2025, CFO Huang Falian resigned due to personal work arrangements, replaced by Zhou Xiaohui, who has a background in investment and financing. In March 2026, the securities affairs representative Chen Wei resigned, replaced by Yin Xinyue. Previously, during the transformation, as the automotive business was divested, almost the entire senior management team was replaced, with the management from Jietai Technology taking over operations.

The story of Junda Co., Ltd. is a complex narrative about opportunities of the era, capital operations, and industry cycles. It once accurately caught the photovoltaic wind, achieving a leap in market value and performance through a “gambling” style acquisition. However, as the industry tide recedes, risks have gradually surfaced.

Currently, with overcapacity and declining prices in the photovoltaic industry still ongoing, the profitability of the battery cell segment is severely compressed. Short-term profitability turnaround is highly challenging. Although overseas revenue share has increased, affected by international trade, tariffs, and geopolitical factors, overseas projects (such as the 5GW battery plant in Oman) face uncertainties, and overseas gross profit margins have shrunk to only 0.75%. The huge losses in 2025 are not only a performance report but also a stress test of its business model’s risk resistance and corporate governance.

From a cross-sector star to a predicament, Junda’s case reminds investors that while pursuing high-growth sectors, they must also carefully examine the company’s financial health, strategic sustainability, and governance standards. With industry adjustments still unresolved and heavy financial burdens, whether Junda can navigate the cycle and truly transform from a “capital story” to “industrial profitability” remains to be seen. (Produced by “Financial Weekly - Financial Affairs”)