#私钥与钱包安全漏洞 The on-chain data of the Trust Wallet browser plugin incident is quite interesting—$6 million was stolen, and this scale is traceable. I reviewed the key details of this incident, and here are a few noteworthy points:
First, this is not a security design flaw of the wallet plugin itself, but an implementation vulnerability in a specific version (2.68). Historically, mainstream wallets like MetaMask and Phantom have experienced similar issues, but large-scale fund losses are often caused by counterfeit software and phishing attacks, which indicates that user-side risk recognition is a more significant weak point.
SlowMist's advice is worth noting—if you are still using the affected version, be sure to disconnect from the internet before exporting your seed phrase and transferring assets. The reason is simple: wallets online may be monitored in real-time. Also, note that the official fix version still retains the PostHog JS data collection code, which hints that data collection risks still exist.
From an investment research perspective, a key signal from such incidents is: security vulnerabilities in large wallets can directly impact on-chain fund flow patterns. I will focus on tracking the flow of funds out of these affected addresses over the next few days, especially large transfers to exchanges, which can reflect the liquidation pressure on stolen funds. Additionally, the flow of related compensation or insurance payout funds is also worth monitoring.
Recommendation: Download wallet plugins only from official channels (Chrome Web Store), and regularly check the plugin version number. If you are using an old or suspicious version, back up immediately and handle offline.
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#私钥与钱包安全漏洞 The on-chain data of the Trust Wallet browser plugin incident is quite interesting—$6 million was stolen, and this scale is traceable. I reviewed the key details of this incident, and here are a few noteworthy points:
First, this is not a security design flaw of the wallet plugin itself, but an implementation vulnerability in a specific version (2.68). Historically, mainstream wallets like MetaMask and Phantom have experienced similar issues, but large-scale fund losses are often caused by counterfeit software and phishing attacks, which indicates that user-side risk recognition is a more significant weak point.
SlowMist's advice is worth noting—if you are still using the affected version, be sure to disconnect from the internet before exporting your seed phrase and transferring assets. The reason is simple: wallets online may be monitored in real-time. Also, note that the official fix version still retains the PostHog JS data collection code, which hints that data collection risks still exist.
From an investment research perspective, a key signal from such incidents is: security vulnerabilities in large wallets can directly impact on-chain fund flow patterns. I will focus on tracking the flow of funds out of these affected addresses over the next few days, especially large transfers to exchanges, which can reflect the liquidation pressure on stolen funds. Additionally, the flow of related compensation or insurance payout funds is also worth monitoring.
Recommendation: Download wallet plugins only from official channels (Chrome Web Store), and regularly check the plugin version number. If you are using an old or suspicious version, back up immediately and handle offline.